CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Aftercare as Afterthought: Re-entry and the California Youth Authority

CONTACT: Daniel Macallair
E-mail: [dmacallair@cjcj.org]
Tel: (415) 621-5661 x310

Each year, more than 2,000 youthful offenders are released from the California Youth Authority (CYA). The challenge for the State of California is to preserve public safety and assist youthful offenders to make a positive transition to a productive life. Because every youthful offender will be released back to society, the costs of failure are staggering, and it is clearly in the best interest of our communities to rehabilitate this population. Given the extraordinary number of other urgent priorities, this public-safety challenge must be met with as much cost-efficiency as possible. Limited resources should be targeted at prevention and intervention programs with strong track records in preventing re-offense. Solutions do exist, and successful programs can become part of a statewide juvenile justice improvement strategy.

The CYA population includes the most serious juvenile offenders in the state. Most wards are committed for violent crimes, and are institutionalized for more than two years on average. The reentry process for CYA parolees fails to adequately prepare them for an independent, self-sufficient lifestyle outside of a correctional institution. The current system is highly fragmented and relies heavily on CYA parole agents who, despite the best of intentions, face significant obstacles to providing effective services. Constrained by caseloads as high as fifty parolees or more, no specialized training, and insufficient resources to even provide each parolee with a bus pass, parole agents are nonetheless responsible for providing parolees with services critical to a successful transition to their communities.

Current systems in California fail to adequately address the 91% recidivism rate of CYA parolees. This failure perpetuates an ineffective juvenile justice system in which youthful offenders cycle in and out of institutional facilities at an annual cost of $48,400 per offender. The high costs of crime, quantified in Appendix A, demonstrate that failing to invest in our youth costs society a lot more than the direct costs of incarceration: it costs society more than $1.7 million for each youth that drops out of school to become involved in a life of crime and drug abuse. Beyond the fiscal impact, the damaging collateral effects of the current system are felt at the individual, community, and statewide level, as large numbers of violent youthful offenders leave institutions and camps without a high school diploma, fractured social supports, and strong gang affiliations. Therefore, investing in reintegration programs that produce even a moderate reduction in recidivism reflects a sound, cost-effective investment decision.

Although the current state system is overwhelmed, there are answers. Effective programs range from the CYA Transitional Residential Program (recently eliminated due to inadequate funding), to the case-management continuum of care model employed by the state of Missouri. With an annual juvenile correctional budget one-third less than the eight surrounding states, Missouri boasts a 10% recidivism rate. Institutional education services also demonstrate success: of CYA wards that participated in a post-secondary college program, 80% did not return to prison after release.

Although each individual faces unique barriers, common challenges face all youthful offenders reentering their communities. The following barriers to successful reentry have been identified by researchers and were repeatedly cited in interviews with parole agents, service providers, researchers, and former wards:

• Lack of educational options: The average age of CYA parolees upon release is 21, which excludes them from the state's responsibility to provide a public education.
• Lack of housing options: For parolees for which family placement is not an option, residential transitional and treatment beds are in short supply.
• Limited skills and education: In 2001, only 11.5% of CYA students passed the California High School Exit Exam.
• Gang affiliations and attendant racial tensions: Incarceration in secure facilities strengthens and solidifies gang relationships.
• Institutional identity: The institutional policies, constant structure, and external discipline do not prepare wards for an independent life that requires internal discipline, motivation, and realistic expectations.
• Substance abuse problems: Over 65% of wards have substance abuse problems.
• Mental health problems: The CYA estimates that 45% of male wards and 65% of female wards in 2000 had mental health problems.
• Lack of community supports and role models: Most parolees will return to communities marked by conditions of poverty, family dysfunction and/or abuse.
• Legislative barriers that limit access to education, cash assistance, and public housing: Ex-offenders, particularly those with certain convictions, are restricted from educational financial aid, public housing, food stamps, and certain types of employment, such as childcare and education.

Given the staggering cost of failure, it is hard to imagine any justifiable argument against providing education and services to this population. The multiple service needs and histories of violent behavior among CYA wards necessitate a system of care that addresses the root causes of criminal activity. Despite the increasing recognition in theory of the role of reentry programs in reducing recidivism, federal and state policies devote insufficient resources to prevention and intervention programs with demonstrable records of effective treatment provision at lower costs than institutionalization. Current emphases on supervision and law enforcement rather than reintegration and support fail to attend to these issues.

While the specific elements of an effective reentry program may vary, the ultimate goal is the same: to preserve public safety, reduce recidivism, and assist individuals to achieve success. Reentry experts identify the following minimum components of "success": an individual not being rearrested since release, not being recommitted for a parole violation, and attending school and/or maintaining employment. These principles inform the following recommendations for reforming and improving the reentry process:

• Implement the case management continuum of care model employed by the State of Missouri Division of Youth Services.
• Create a pilot program to utilize contract arrangements for institutional program services.
• Create additional community-based treatment and supervision slots for CYA wards.
• Transfer authority for determining length of stay and conditions of parole for CYA wards from the Youthful Offender Parole Board to the committing court.
• Expand community corrections sanctions, such as community service, restitution, and halfway houses.
• Create educational alternatives, such as Los Angeles-based Save Our Future.
• Expand gender-specific services.
• Replicate model programs, such as the Missouri Department of Youth Services.

When youthful offenders leave the CYA, the barriers they face far outweigh the opportunities for a successful reintegration into the community. Indeed, the odds are against them: low education, high unemployment, and a high likelihood that they'll re-offend. The people of California have already paid a terrible price for crime, and the price tag will continue to rise if we do not develop effective programs to prepare youthful offenders for life in the community. Although the list of barriers is daunting, certain strategies have demonstrated positive results. Although these solutions are not free, they are far cheaper than inaction. This report highlights nine exemplary programs in seven states and the District of Columbia that have demonstrated success through collaborative, comprehensive services at a lower per-capita cost than incarceration. The result is a win-win: improved public safety, lower costs, and a positive investment in our future.

Howard M. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, "Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report." National Center of Juvenile Justice. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention: 82, an adaptation of Cohen's "The Monetary Value of Saving a High-Risk Youth," Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 14 no. 1. Bonnie Todis et al., "Overcoming the Odds: Qualitative Examination of Resilience Among Formerly Incarcerated Adolescents," Exceptional Children (2001): 119-139.

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