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The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws in California

CONTACT: Daniel Macallair
E-mail: [dmacallair@cjcj.org]
Tel: (415) 621-5661 x310

Introduction

Youth curfews are fast rising to the top of the public policy agenda. President Clinton, California Governor Pete Wilson and others have hailed curfews as a remedy for youth crime. Currently the U.S. Senate is considering legislation, S. 10, which would house youth curfew violators with adult prisoners.

Despite extensive public discussion of youth curfews, until now there has been no comprehensive academic study of current curfew laws to determine their effect on juvenile crime. Even the youth curfew in Monrovia, California, perhaps the most touted curfew, has not been critically examined.

The study results were clear: youth curfews don't reduce the rate of youth crime - not for any race of youth, not for any region, not for any type of crime.

Methodology

This study compares curfew arrest rates and youth crime rates from 1978 through 1996 for the entire State of California. This analysis thus examines whether year-by-year changes in police enforcement of youth curfew affects the corresponding rate of youth crime.

In addition, youth crime rates and curfew arrest rates are compared for each of the 12 most populous counties in California. Youth crime and curfew arrests were also examined for all 21 cities with populations over 100,000 in Los Angeles and Orange counties. The analysis thus compares youth crime in areas with high rates of curfew enforcement to youth crime in areas with low rates of curfew enforcement.

Since curfew laws do not apply to adults, these laws should affect youth crime rates, but not adult crime rates. Therefore youth crime rates were also compared to adult crime rates in each analysis. This technique isolates curfew laws from larger trends in crime that would otherwise disguise the impact of curfew laws on youth crime.

Data was broken down by ethnicity and type of crime to capture any variations by category that might be due to curfew laws. A separate analysis of Monrovia is presented as a case study.

All crime statistics in this study are taken directly from the California Department of Justice.

Findings

This study found that youth curfews do not reduce youth crime. This was true for any race of youth, for any region, for any type of crime. In those few instances in which a significant effect on youth crime was found, curfews were more likely to be associated with an increase in youth crime (not including curfew citations).

For the entire state of California there was no category of crime (misdemeanors, violent crime, property crime, etc.) which significantly declined in association with youth curfews. However, a significant increase in youth misdemeanors was associated with youth curfews.

When examining just African-American youth or Latino youth, the study found that youth curfews associated with no significant effect on crime. However, the study did find that for White and Asian youth, curfews associated with an increase in crime, particularly misdemeanors.

Overall, counties with strict youth curfews witnessed no decrease in youthcrime relative to counties without strict curfews.

Four large counties displayed a racial bias in curfew enforcement. In Los Angeles County authorities arrest Latino and African-American youth for curfew violations at rates two to three times that of white youth. In Ventura County, curfew arrests of Latino and African-American youths are 8.4 and 7.4 times higher, respectively than those of white youths. In Fresno and Santa Clara counties, Latino youth are five times, and African-American youth, three times, more likely to be arrested for curfew violations.

When examining individual cities, again the study could not find evidence to support the proposition that curfews lead to a decrease in youth crime. Monrovia in particular witnessed increases in youth crime associated with its curfew. Monrovia Debunked

Monrovia's school day curfew, the first in the country, has been widely touted as a success, even winning an emotional endorsement from President Clinton during a campaign stop in Monrovia. The Monrovia Police Department credited the curfew with a dramatic drop in crime during school hours.

However the very opposite picture emerged from detailed police records during a lawsuit filed by parents. The study found that youth crime skyrocketed by 53% during the school months when the curfew is most vigorously enforced, yet declined by 12% in the summer months when the curfew was not enforced.

The study also found racial bias in curfew enforcement. Youth of color comprise 55% of Monrovia's population age 10-17 and 68% of its curfew arrestees. Compared to white youth, youth of color are twice as likely to be cited under the curfew than their proportion of the population would predict. More than half of the total offenses involving minority youth were curfew violations. In effect, the curfew doubled the crime rate among Monrovia's youth of color.

Recommendations

Curfew laws should not be regarded as an effective method for deterring youth crime. The failure of curfew laws follows a larger pattern indicating that law-enforcement strategies for reducing youth crime have reached a dead end. To move forward other approaches must be considered, such as prevention strategies that provide support for youth before they become involved in crime.

The study, entitled "The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws in California," is co-authored by Mike Males and Dan Macallair. Mr. Males is a doctoral candidate in the School of Social Ecology at UC Irvine. Mr. Macallair is associate director of the Justice Policy Institute. The study is forthcoming in the September, 1998 edition of the Western Criminology Review, a peer-reviewed academic journal. All crime data used in the study came directly from the California Department of Justice.

This study was made possible through funding from the California Wellness , Haigh Scatena, Heller, Vanguard, and Van Loben Sels Foundations.

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