REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

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Abstract

This article examines the decline of rehabilitation in juvenile justice throughout much of the United States over the past 20 years. This decline was facilitated by the progressive community's abandonment of rehabilitation and their acceptance of the justice model as a means to restrict the growing number of youth in correctional institutions. The justice model was conceived as a means to impose confinement limitations through standardized sentencing, while accommodating conservative demands for retribution and punishment. However, contrary to expectations, the justice model promoted an unprecedented rise in the number of incarcerated youth and a deterioration in institutional conditions. This was occurring despite mounting evidence demonstrating the superior effectiveness of rehabilitation models in altering patterns of delinquency. Conclusions were based on an analysis of juvenile correctional systems in California, Massachusetts, Utah, Washington. The evidence shows that rehabilitation should be reaffirmed as the foundation for a progressive agenda in juvenile justice.
# REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE

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Rehabilitation and the Juvenile Justice System

For the past 20 years, the juvenile justice system in the United States has been the subject of the most intensive policy debates in its history. These debates were the result of a number of studies conducted during the 1970s which concluded that most correctional rehabilitation programs had little impact on the offender's post-release behavior. The most infamous of these studies was the Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1975) report. After examining 231 evaluation studies of correctional treatment programs, the authors concluded, "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have no appreciable effect on recidivism (1975, p.25)."

This statement, interpreted as "nothing works," resounded throughout correctional bureaucracies, legislatures, and the media. The Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks report was published at a time when crime rates were on the rise (Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky, Austin, 1986). Many viewed this trend as indicative of a breakdown in the moral and social order and the leniency of the criminal courts.

The indictment of the rehabilitative model, along with growing public concern over crime, propelled a search for an alternative. Conservatives traditionally viewed the philosophy of rehabilitation with derision, because it conflicted with their notion of deterrence and reciprocity through punishment. Liberals, lamenting the juvenile justice system's historic emphasis on custody and control, abandoned their traditional support for rehabilitation as impractical. As a result of this dissension, rehabilitation experienced a precipitous decline throughout most of the United States during the 1980s (Greenwood 1986).

The concept of rehabilitation in juvenile justice was based on the belief that childhood and adolescence are periods of growth and development. Since patterns of proper behavior evolve from nurturing, the goal of benign intervention was to serve the best interests of the child. With the state assuming the role of parent, formal legal procedures and protections were shunned in favor of an informal decision process (Empey 1982).

For most of the 19th and 20th centuries, youths under the age of 18 were sent to institutions, also known as reform schools or training schools, for offenses such as stubbornness, thievery, truancy, assault, and lewdness. The institution's purpose was to provide a strict and isolated environment far from urban corruption where youths could be imbued with proper work habits and moral fortitude (Empey 1982).

However, it was soon recognized that involuntary confinement in these institutions bred the worst aspects of human behavior. As a result, staff became obsessed with maintaining
order and security. As living conditions grew more restrictive and oppressive, youths became more recalcitrant and the institutional environment became the antithesis of humane individualized care (Rothman 1980). After reviewing the history of the Massachusetts State Reform School at Westborough, Lief (1988, p.1) noted that despite continual attempts to “reconstruct architecture, secularize the curriculum, revise the roles of personnel, rename philosophical objectives, and modify systems of punishment and control...it is striking how little the daily experiences of inmates and keepers changed over a period of 128 years.”

Under the institutional system, the goal of rehabilitation became subordinate to organizational demands and political expediency. Policy makers, needing a convenient response to crime and poverty issues, continued to expand the number of public training schools throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. By 1960, the position of institutions as the foundation for the juvenile correctional system stood unchallenged.

**Diversion and Deinstitutionalization**

During the 1960s, the efficacy of correctional institutions came under increasing assault (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967). In response, reformers designed new strategies to reduce the number of institutionalized youth. Two primary reforms emerged from these efforts: diversion and deinstitutionalization.

Diversion was designed to encourage police, prosecutors, and probation officers to refer youths to community programs as an alternative to arrest and formal judicial processing. However, later evaluations revealed that diversion was practiced on youths who previously would have been released at the time of intake and not formally processed (Klein 1975). In addition, youths who were not deemed eligible for diversion were subjected to harsher treatment and more severe sanctions (Palmer 1978). This situation led researchers to conclude that diversion was actually extending systems of social control (Krisberg and Austin, 1981).

Deinstitutionalization was intended to divert youths from correctional institutions once they were formally processed and committed. One of the most widely reviewed experiments of deinstitutionalization was carried out by the California Youth Authority (CYA) during the 1960s. In an effort to slow its institutional population growth, the CYA, through state legislation, initiated a probation subsidy program to encourage counties to retain youths at the local level. While its purpose was to reduce commitments to the state juvenile correctional system, it was never intended to replace or supplant the CYA’s institutional system. Later studies revealed that throughout the period of probation subsidy, institutional expansion in California continued. Although the rate of commitments declined, periods of confinement
within CYA institutions were steadily increased to maintain a consistent population. In addition, counties began expanding local training schools and secure detention facilities. The proportion of institutionalized youths throughout California remained unchanged during the period of probation subsidy (Lerman 1975).

The Ascendancy of the Justice Model

Disillusioned with the failed efforts of diversion and deinstitutionalization, progressive reformers sought to reconcile their strategies to the institutional system's realities. To reach a compromise with conservative constituencies, many juvenile justice reformers embraced the justice or "just deserts" model of corrections (Cullen and Gilbert 1984; Castellano, 1986).

First promulgated in the 1970s, the justice model is founded on the concept of fixed and uniform degrees of punishment for specific crimes. Its intent is to inject certainty and consistency into the sentencing process by limiting the discretion of judges and correctional personnel in determining lengths of incarceration. Under this scheme, correctional administrators are no longer expected to pursue rehabilitation or other forms of individualized intervention. Their main function is to administer punishments in a fair and humane manner (Fogel 1975).

Contrary to the expectations of its proponents, the justice model strengthened the institutional system and left progressive advocates without a compelling alternative. In their critique of the justice model, researchers Cullen and Gilbert (1981, pp. 19-20) identified three primary failures of this strategy as a basis for progressive reform:

First, in basing punishment strictly on the crime and not the criminal, implicit in the determinate sentencing paradigm is the assumption that the state not only has no right but also no obligation to do anything about the condition or needs of an offender. Yet, we may ask, is a philosophy that gives legitimacy to state neglect of individual needs likely to be more benevolent than one that mandates, however imperfectly, state concern? Second, it is highly ironic that those who mistrust the state to administer criminal justice rehabilitation in a just and humane manner are now placing their total faith in the state (the legislature in particular) to punish justly and humanely. We have searched in vain to discover the basis for this faith. And third, in the past, the failure of treatment programs has invariably evoked a plea among liberal reformers that inmates receive more and not less rehabilitation. When the new agenda for punishment fails to reduce crime at some point in the future, what will the call be for then? Less punishment - or more?
The reality of Cullen and Gilbert’s warnings was quickly manifested. The justice model facilitated unprecedented increases in institutional populations and an accompanying deterioration in confinement conditions.

The Impact of the Justice Model on Juvenile Correctional Systems

The states of Washington and California adopted the justice model through different approaches. However, both approaches had a profound effect on institutional populations.

Washington, in 1977, implemented a comprehensive justice model when the state legislature established mandatory sentencing standards requiring all adjudicated juvenile offenders between the ages of 8 and 17 to serve specified time periods in a correctional institution for specific offenses (Siegel and Senna, 1985).

Within five years, the number of institutionalized youths in the State of Washington swelled, while confinement conditions deteriorated (Castellano 1986; Corsaletti 1991). Although the average length of stay in secure custody initially declined, a higher percentage of youth were committed to state correctional institutions. Since 1984, the average length of stay has increased every year (see Figure 5). Currently, the three main facilities are operating at 112% of capacity (The Children’s Alliance 1991).

The Washington juvenile correctional system is now the subject of a possible lawsuit over institutional conditions. After touring the state’s juvenile training schools, attorneys from the National Center for Youth Law and the Youth Law Center noted that they were all in a state of decay. Programming was compromised for security concerns, while violence and abuse was pervasive. Staff maintain order through the use of police riot equipment, which includes a pepper-based eye spray that incapacitates disruptive youths. Washington’s Department of Juvenile Rehabilitation consulting physician, Dr. James Owens, concluded that the product could cause permanent eye damage (David Lambert, National Center for Youth Law, personal interview, August 1991; Claudia Wright, Youth Law Center, personal interview, May, 1991).

One rationale underlying the Washington State reforms was the belief that recidivism would be lowered by increasing the certainty of punishment. In her study on the effects of Washington’s mandatory sentencing guidelines on juvenile recidivism, Schneider (1984) found that the new law had little impact on post release behavior and that in urban counties delinquent activity actually increased. This led Castellano (1986, p.502) to conclude from his review of the Washington system that: “...there is no evidence to suggest that the adoption of a ‘just deserts’ approach to juvenile offending has reduced juvenile delinquency.”
In California, uniform confinement guidelines were adopted by the Youthful Offender Parole Board (YOPB) in 1978 following the implementation of the adult determinate sentencing act. The YOPB, composed of gubernatorial appointees, establishes confinement lengths for all youths committed to the California Youth Authority (CYA) by the juvenile courts. Similar to the adult sentencing laws, the YOPB guidelines have been revised upwards on three occasions over the past 13 years. According to a recent report by the YOPB:

The accompanying time intervals were established to be consistent with the time-setting intent described by the Legislature when mandatory sentences for adults committed to State prison were adopted. A still existing correlation was thus established between parole consideration dates and what was then the newly established determinate sentencing law. It was at that time that seven offense categories were identified and an appropriate time interval for each category was assigned (Youthful Offender Parole Board, Department of the Youth Authority, 1988).

The YOPB utilizes seven categories to designate lengths of institutional stay based on the seriousness of the crime and the youth's prior record.

Although California ostensibly maintains rehabilitation as a guiding principle, the State Legislature amended the juvenile court statutes in 1982 to include punishment as a disposition goal.

...Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment and guidance which is consistent with their best interest, which holds them accountable for their behavior, and which is appropriate for their circumstances...Such guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter....

(e) As used in this chapter, "punishment" means the imposition of sanctions which include the following:

(1) Payment of a fine by the minor.

(2) Rendering of compulsory service without compensation performed for the benefit of the community by the minor.

(3) Limitations on the minor's liberty imposed as a condition of probation or parole.

(4) Commitment of the minor to a local detention or treatment facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp, or ranch.
Commitment of the minor to the Department of the Youth Authority (California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 202)...

This amendment legitimized the punitive nature of the California system and provided further impetus towards longer and more severe periods of incarceration.

Within 12 years of the adoption of parole guidelines, the CYA population went from approximately 4707 to 7032 (California Youth Authority, Information Services, personal correspondence, September 24, 1991). The absence of a rehabilitative emphasis is evidenced by the large prison design and congregate dormitories. Like the reform schools of the past century, daily conditions in the CYA's 16 juvenile institutions are characterized by extreme degrees of violence, intimidation, and idleness. Little meaningful intervention occurs as youths vie for dominance within a traditional prison subculture (Lerner 1986).

The increase in incarceration was followed by a corresponding rise in recidivism rates. A study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, (NCCD) found an alarming 84% rearrest rate for CYA parolees within three years of release (Baird 1987). In addition, a study by the CYA's own research division cited a rise in recidivism among parolees as periods of institutionalized confinement increased (Youthful Offender Parole Board, Department of the Youth Authority 1988) (See Figures 1 and 2).

The expansion of the CYA population was unrelated to any increase in the crime rate or its severity. In 1988, the CYA was incarcerating a higher degree of less serious delinquent youth than they were in 1977 (see Figures 3 and 4). The justice model's vulnerability to political manipulation and meddling was evident from the start. Since just punishment is a subjective judgement, calls for harsher sentences are easily accommodated within a punitive oriented system (Cullen, Gilbert, 1981). Despite its past limitations, rehabilitation challenged the propriety of conditions within institutions and offered a basis for the development of non-institutional alternatives. When this expectation was removed, the incentive among correctional bureaucracies to improve conditions or maintain treatment was eliminated.

Rehabilitation and Organizational Commitment

While California and Washington were abandoning rehabilitation, Massachusetts and Utah were reaffirming it. Recognizing the failure of the institutional model, Massachusetts in 1971, under the leadership of Commissioner Jerome G. Miller, closed its five juvenile correctional training schools (Ohlin, Coates, and Miller, 1978; Rutherford 1974; Bakal, Polsky, 1979).
Rather than abandon rehabilitation, Miller, on his own initiative, sought to redress the contradictions of the institutional system. He determined that the only way to eliminate institutional violence and abuses was to abolish the training school system. Between 1971 and 1973 all five of the Massachusetts training schools were closed. They were replaced by a network of small community-based programs operating in neighborhoods throughout the state. These reforms were the most dramatic in the history of corrections in America. Never had an established correctional bureaucracy been so completely altered and recast. Miller envisioned that the closing of the institutions would allow the juvenile justice system to finally pursue its original goal of humane individualized treatment (Ohlin, Coates, and Miller 1978; Rutherford 1978; Polsky and Bakal, 1978).

While the initial disruptions and uncertainties resulted in a political backlash and the eventual departure of Commissioner Miller, the closing of the institutions was irreversible. As Miller's successors consolidated the reforms, a consensus developed reinforcing the propriety of the changes (Ohlin, Miller, & Coates, Rutherford, 1976; Polsky & Bakal, 1978).

Following the Massachusetts example, Utah in 1980 closed its one 450-bed training school and shifted youths to community-based programs. As in Massachusetts, money that formerly was spent maintaining institutions went toward contracting with private agencies in local communities and neighborhoods. Services were designed to meet the demands of youths with diverse needs and circumstances. For the few youths who required secure confinement, Utah maintains two 35-bed intensive treatment programs (Van Fleet, Rutherford, Schwartz, 1987).

With a flexible range of programs, the state was able to invest heavily in providing high quality treatment services for its chronic and violent offenders in secure confinement. What distinguishes these programs from the past large congregate institutions is the absence of a prison subculture. Treatment is comprehensive and individualized. For those youths requiring non-secure custody, intensive outreach and tracking programs are provided in their home and neighborhoods. This treatment is offered at a fraction of the cost of secure residential treatment or confinement (Krisberg, Austin, Joe, Steele, 1988).

A study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) found a 66% decline in the frequency of subsequent arrests for youths released from Utah's juvenile correctional programs during a twelve month follow-up. This "suppression effect" led NCCD researchers to conclude:

...the recidivism data for Youth Corrections offenders strongly indicate that the imposition of appropriate community-based controls on highly active serious and chronic juvenile offenders is consistent with public protection goals. The
well-structured community-based programs of Utah’s Division of Youth Corrections may well constitute an important new range of dispositional options for handling serious and chronic juvenile offenders (Krisberg, Austin, Joe, Steele, 1988).

Comparing Rehabilitation Models with Justice Models

Of the 1,600 youths committed to the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services in 1990, only 15% are confined in locked secure-treatment programs. The majority of the committed population is spread throughout a variety of residential and nonresidential programs. Approximately 65% of these youths are maintained in their homes with supportive services (Loughran 1987). The programs utilized in Massachusetts and Utah include day treatment, temporary shelter care, intensive outreach and tracking, specialized foster care, wilderness adventure, group care, and secure residential (Lerner 1990).

By contrast, 100% of first commitments to the California Youth Authority and 90% of the committed population to the Washington Division of Juvenile Rehabilitation (DJR) are confined in secure correctional institutions. In addition, the average length of confinement in a California Youth Authority training school is now 24.7 months, while in Massachusetts the average period of time in a secure program is 7.3 months. The vulnerability of justice models to consistent increases in periods of incarceration is reflected in Figure 5. Between 1982 and 1990, the average length of institutional confinement in Washington and California steadily increased, while it remained relatively stable in Utah. In addition, while yearly figures were not available for Massachusetts, Department of Youth Service (DYS) officials assert that the average length of stay has remained constant (Executive Assistance to the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, personal interview, September 1991).

By correctional standards, conditions of confinement in secure facilities in Utah and Massachusetts are considered models of humane treatment, while youth correctional institutions in California and Washington are riddled by violence and decay (Lerner 1990, 1986; Corsaletti, 1991). In addition, a recent study concluded:

California now incarcerates a higher percentage of its youths for longer periods of time in larger and more secure facilities than any other major state in the nation. Rates of incarceration at local and state levels are twice the national average (DeMuro, DeMuro & Lerner, 1988, p.15).

The differences in the four states is even more startling when census figures from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) on youth in public custody
facilities is examined (see Figure 6). According to OJJDP researchers Thornberry, Tolnay, Flanagan, and Glynn (1991, p.16), public facilities, "whether short-term or long-term, were much more likely to be institutional." Additionally, there are extreme differences between states in the number and type of committed youth placed in institutional confinement (See Figure 7).

Reconsidering Rehabilitation

The decline of rehabilitation was partly attributed to the perceived failure of researchers to demonstrate clearly that rehabilitation fostered lower rates of recidivism. According to Cullen and Gendreau (1989, p.38) "a reality has been constructed and legitimized by many criminologists that rehabilitation is a failed policy that the public will no longer tolerate." As a result of this pervasive perception, tougher sentencing and waivers to adult court became the dominant juvenile justice reform in the majority of states (Greenwood 1986).

However, during the 1980s, new evidence emerged suggesting that the demise of rehabilitation was premature. A growing number of studies indicate that rehabilitative intervention is effective in de-escalating criminal behavior (Gendreau and Ross, 1987; Krisberg, Austin, Joe, Steele, 1987). Various well-designed interventions reduce the severity and frequency of delinquency and alters the cycle that leads to adult crime.

Studies have noted that approximately 40% of adult prison populations are graduates of institution-based juvenile justice systems (Rivers, Trotti, 1989). This finding is consistent with reviews of the adult prison population in Massachusetts prior to 1971. According to evaluations, since the reforms of 20 years ago, the number of youths graduating to the adult criminal justice system in Massachusetts has fallen to 15% (Loughran 1987).

A 1987 evaluation of the Massachusetts juvenile justice system by NCCD revealed a recidivism rate of 42% as measured by the number of youths reconvicted of an offense after one year. When compared to four other states, Massachusetts had the lowest rates. In contrast, California, the most extreme example of a punitive institutional model, also recorded a reconviction rate of 53% (see Figure 8). Finally, only 23% of Massachusetts youth were reincarcerated after 36 months compared to California’s rate of 62% (Krisberg, Austin & Steele, 1989) (See Figure 9).

Well-developed and properly implemented rehabilitative programs are demonstrating tangible evidence of altering delinquent behavior and arrest patterns. For example, the Violent Juvenile Offender (VJO) Program was an experimental project designed to test the effectiveness of intensive programming for chronic and violent juvenile offenders. Services were provided along a continuum starting with secure care and then progressing to community
reintegration through intensive case management. The project was tested in four cities around the country. When recidivism results strongly favored the experimental group, researcher Jeffrey Fagan (1990, p.258) concluded:

The VJO Program tested a central proposition: carefully implemented and well-managed programs, rooted in sound theory and advanced practices, can effectively control violent juvenile crime and return offenders to their communities without risking community safety. The well-implemented programs resulted in significant reductions in the number and severity of arrests for experimental youths, as well as in significantly greater time until rearrest. The delays in return to crime for experimental youths during the critical first year following release suggest that the reintegration strategy also may be effective crime control.

The positive effect of other well-designed and implemented intervention models continues to be recognized. An evaluation of the Vision Quest experiential education program, by the Rand Corporation, showed substantially lower rates of recidivism among Vision Quest graduates, compared to a matched sample of youthful offenders from a county training school in California. The lower recidivism occurred despite the fact that Vision Quest youths had considerably longer and more serious histories of delinquency. After a one year follow-up, Vision Quest youths had a recidivism rate of 55%, compared to the training school youths of 71%. In addition, a smaller matched sample of CYA youths recorded a recidivism rate of 88%. Recidivism was measured by new arrests (Greenwood 1987).

Another study conducted by the Oregon Social Learning Center tested the effectiveness of specialized foster care (SFC) for chronic delinquent youths who were diverted from state correctional institutions. Youths in the experimental group were placed in specialized foster homes and provided with highly individualized treatment. Youths in the comparison group were placed in traditional residential programs or facilities. One year after completing the program, experimental youths had dramatically lower reoffense rates, as measured by subsequent reincarceration. According to Patterson (1987, pp. 10, 13):

During the first year of follow-up post-treatment, 6 of 16 adolescents in the experimental group (38%) and 14 of 16 in the control group (88%) were reinstitutionalized...

The results presented in this report provide preliminary support for the efficacy of applications of the SFC model.

A study by Palmer and Wedge (1987) on county camps and ranches in California found that smaller individualized programs had rates of recidivism 18% lower than those with more
traditional congregate institutional designs and practices. These differences were maintained even among youths with longer and more severe delinquent histories.

The value of intensive case management was demonstrated in 1988 when the State of Maryland closed one of its two training schools by contracting with the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives (NCIA). Under the plan, the State provided funding for the purchase of services on a case-by-case basis. Individualized service plans were implemented for 117 of the institution's most intractable youths. Case managers worked closely with youths to develop trust and understanding, while services were purchased from private-sector vendors according to each youths' circumstances and needs. A follow-up evaluation found that after one year only 35 youth were rearrested. Of those arrested, one was for a violent offense and only six were reincarcerated (Lerner 1990).

Similar results were recorded by NCIA's Hawaii Youth Advocacy Project. NCIA was contracted by the Hawaii Department of Corrections to initiate the process of deinstitutionalization through the closing of the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility. Through intensive case management, 26 youths out of a total population of 75 were returned to the community within a six-month period. A follow-up evaluation found that only four were rearrested. This led criminologist Andrew Rutherford (1990, p. 19) to conclude:

"As only 4 of the 26 releasees have been rearrested for further offences (for which charges were still pending and none of which involved violence), it is reasonable to conclude that the project was conducted without undue threat to public safety. Indeed, the results strongly suggest that the project has provided enhanced public protection through the new services provided during the three month follow-up period.

The NCIA programs demonstrated the effectiveness of an intensive personalized approach to providing services to the juvenile justice system's most troubled youth. The vital element in achieving success was the programs' vigorous advocacy and the ability of staff to form bonds with youths (Macallair, 1990).

The positive results of the NCIA programs was supported by Lipsey's (1990) recent meta analysis of juvenile correctional treatment programs. His analysis of 443 studies showed modest but positive results when they were reviewed in their totality. However, when various types of approaches were examined, dramatic results were observed. For example, Lipsey found that programs employing case work approaches could reduce recidivism by 10 to 20 percentage points. In contrast, programs administered by juvenile justice bureaucracies yielded the least favorable results. Programs that used deterrence strategies such as shock incarceration and "scared straight" approaches tended to escalate delinquent behavior (37-39).
In their comprehensive review of the research on rehabilitation, Gendreau and Ross (1987) concluded that contrary to popular assumptions, the evidence overwhelming indicates that rehabilitation programs work. While not eliminating recidivism, rehabilitation is more effective than correctional institutions in reducing the rate and seriousness of criminal behavior.

Conclusion

An examination of juvenile justice in much of the United States reveals a system dominated by archaic 19th century correctional models and theories. Despite the doctrine of rehabilitation, the institution-based system is an unequivocal failure. As former Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention director, Ira Schwartz (1989, p. 169) notes:

All large training schools should be closed. These institutions are expensive to operate and difficult to manage, and they simply don't work. They have no place in an enlightened and cost effective youth correctional system.

Due to their past inabilities to alter institutional conditions, reformers have been rendered frustrated and disheartened. This situation led many to resign themselves to the institutional system and embrace the justice model in hopes of at least limiting periods of confinement. However, by abandoning rehabilitation, progressive advocates effectively disarmed themselves in the battle over juvenile justice policy. Legislative and bureaucratic debates came to center on degrees of punishment rather than its legitimacy. Under these conditions, conservatives were able to pursue their agenda of harsher punishments with little opposition.

The acceptance of the justice model by the progressive community proved disastrous. Instead of reining in the power of the institutional system, it served to augment it. To regain the political momentum, reformers must reembrace rehabilitation. Rehabilitation enjoys broad public support as demonstrated in a recent California poll. In contrast to its current public policies, 82% of California residents voiced their belief that the purpose of the juvenile justice system should be the pursuit of rehabilitation (Wallace 1988).

A commitment to rehabilitation will reignite efforts to dismantle the institution-based system. Those states and jurisdictions that have implemented effective rehabilitation programs provide models on which to build a new reinvigorated progressive agenda. However, a new commitment to rehabilitation will require a resurgence of activism among the progressive community. A return to rehabilitation is presently the only viable strategy for achieving reductions in custodial confinement and promoting the humane and effective treatment of troubled youths.
**FIGURE 1**

PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE UNSUCCESSFULLY TERMINATED FROM PAROLE

- 1979 - 48.5%
- 1982 - 55.7%
- 1985 - 61.8%

Source: California Youth Authority

**FIGURE 2**

AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY AT RELEASE FOR FIRST COMMITMENTS (IN MONTHS)

- 1979 - 12.6
- 1982 - 15.0
- 1985 - 19.1

Source: California Youth Authority
**FIGURE 3**

Type of Crime - Offenses committed by those entering CYA institutions for the first time (1977)

Source: California Youth Authority; California Legislative Analyst

Drugs - 2.5%
Property - 45.3%
Violent - 45.1%
Others - 7.1%

**FIGURE 4**

Type of Crime - Offenses committed by those entering CYA institutions for the first time (1988)

Source: California Youth Authority; California Legislative Analyst

Drugs - 14%
Property - 43.6%
Violent - 36.1%
Others - 6.3%
FIGURE 5
Average Length of Stay in Secure Custody (in months)

- California
- Utah
- Washington


Figure 6
Youth in Public Custody Facilities Per 100,000

1987 1989
National Average 208 221
*California 496 535
Massachusetts 42 48
Utah 88 85
Washington 229 236

Source: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
* California has the highest rate among all states, while Washington ranks eighth.
FIGURE 7

SECURE CUSTODY COMPARISONS - 1990

<table>
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<th>Average Daily Population in Secure Confinement</th>
<th>Percentage of First Time Commitments in Secure Custody</th>
<th>Average Length of Stay in Secure Confinement (in months)</th>
<th>Average Number of Prior Sustained Petitions for Youth in Secure Custody</th>
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<tr>
<td>MASSACHUSETTS</td>
<td>172</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>90%</td>
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Sources:
California Youth Authority, Information Services
Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Executive Assistant to the Commissioner
Utah Division of Youth Corrections, Research Analyst
State of Utah, Administrative Office of the Courts
Washington Division of Rehabilitative Services, Information Systems Coordinator

FIGURE 8

PERCENTAGE OF PAROLEES RECONVICTED

- Massachusetts - 42%
- California - 55%

[Graph showing percentage of parolees reconvicted for Massachusetts and California]

Source: National Council on Crime and Delinquency
FIGURE 9

**PERCENTAGE OF PAROLEES REINCARCERATED WITHIN 36 MONTHS OF RELEASE**

- California - 62%
- Massachusetts - 22%

Source: National Council on Crime and Delinquency
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