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Emerging from Darkness:
Reinventing San Francisco's Juvenile Justice System

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by

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INTRODUCTION

As fears about juvenile crime continue to grow in California and throughout the nation, public officials and media critics assert that the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile justice system cannot address the new breed of violent juveniles. As a result, policymakers advance punitive sanctions, similar to those administered to adults, as a necessary measure to stem youth crime. But this campaign ignores the fact that rehabilitation has never been more than a phantom

goal. Historically, the juvenile justice system has mirrored the adult prison system by employing practices that segregate, brutalize and stigmatize inmates. Founded on large congregate detention centers and correctional facilities, the system has been characterized as something of a gladiator school, where large numbers of youths are locked away with few opportunities and little hope of escaping years of violence.¹

Nowhere is this legacy of hopelessness more evident than in San Francisco, where the juvenile justice system has been the target of criticism for the past 137 years. Despite this criticism, the system has successfully resisted reform and continues to rely on a 135-bed detention center, where most youths are simply detained for short periods of time and then cycled back into the community

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having received no meaningful or productive intervention. By doing little to alter the life situations and destructive patterns of troubled youths, this approach promotes institutional neglect, mediocrity and brutality. Like many juvenile justice systems, the system in San Francisco faces crucial decisions regarding its future. To achieve a system capable of effectively intervening in the lives of high-risk, young offenders requires the abandonment of existing paradigms and the establishment of new organizational structures and

approaches. Absent a comprehensive restructuring, the system's legacy of failure and neglect will continue to erode its foundation, further diminishing public confidence.

In keeping with the need for such restructuring, this report will examine the legacy of California's juvenile justice policies in San Francisco and will offer a plan for implementing a modern comprehensive system that promotes quality and accountability.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THE CYCLE OF ABUSE

Since the opening of the first New York House of Refuge in 1825, large institutions have dominated juvenile justice policy in the United States. Early reformers theorized that large congregate institutions would provide a strict, regimented and isolated environment where youths "might receive proper moral and intellectual advice and instruction, and be trained to skill in some useful

branch of industry."² It was soon revealed, however, that institutional confinement bred the worst qualities of human behavior: Juvenile inmates resisted strict regimentation, and staff resorted to brutality and oppression. Within a short time, all resemblance to the benign and orderly places envisioned by institutional proponents disappeared. Like the adult penal system, custody in juvenile detention and correctional facilities has resulted in little more than temporary warehousing, wherein the staff's primary mission is maintaining order and control.³

In an environment where controlling behavior is the dominant concern, abuses inevitably result. This familiar scenario has been repeated throughout San Francisco's history, beginning with the opening of the San Francisco Industrial School in 1859.⁴ The Industrial School was modeled on other industrial schools that existed during the late nineteenth century. These institutions arose, in part, as a result of growing dissatisfaction with houses of refuge, which were plagued by overcrowding and abuse from their inception.⁵

After a special grand jury report of abuses in the Industrial School, a local newspaper, the *Alta California*, reported:

Punishments of the most barbarous descriptions have been inflicted on some of the boy inmates from time to time down to a date very recent.... The case of the boy Cassidy, alleged to have had a rib broken by the butt end of a cowhide whip in the hands of Col. Wood... Case of the boy Fletcher Wooster, who is alleged to have been jammed against the wall, struck four or five times, struck with the fist and kicked with his boot by Col. Wood.... The whipping of Benjamin Naphtali till shreds of his shirt stuck to the wounds on his back, and the shirt glued to his body by the blood in the morning, so that it required assistance to get free from it. Saw no kindness or gentleness while I was there; they were treated like dogs. The general tenor and treatment of the boys was barbarous.⁶

More than 100 years later, after many "reforms" and the building of five new institutions, the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported on February 2, 1992:

San Francisco's Youth Guidance Center is being investigated by the city attorney's officer for allegations of criminal child abuse after two youths said they were choked by a counselor in front of staff members, who did nothing to halt the attack. In the first incident, a boy was allegedly choked so severely that he nearly lost

consciousness and urinated on himself. The counselor allegedly then took the boy's soiled clothing around the juvenile hall housing unit, threatening to employ similar measures with other detainees. The next day, the same counselor allegedly repeatedly slammed the head of another boy against the floor before choking the youth and leaving him handcuffed alone for hours with a badly bruised neck. The youths, both 17, were being disciplined for refusing an order to return to their rooms in the housing unit. The boys have since been relocated to the facilities in New Mexico and the city's Log Cabin Ranch detention center in La Honda, San Mateo.⁷

The implications of such institutional confinement were highlighted in a recent study of San Francisco's Youth Guidance Center. According to researchers from Patrick Sullivan and Associates:

Experience and research firmly establish the negative psychological consequences fostered in juveniles consigned to harshly restrictive institutional care. Severe restriction and regimentation make no allowance for youths to assume responsibility for their actions, and so do not encourage personal accountability. Instead, repressive materials and spatial/programmatic arrangements offer the expectation of abusive behavior that is too often self-fulfilling. Challenging disruptive action is invited, and productive intervention becomes an impossibility. A destructive cycle is then created that youths and staff are often unable to break.⁸

THE SOLUTION AS THE PROBLEM

Characterized as a "nursery of crime" by the city's judiciary, San Francisco's first experiment with a juvenile detention and correctional institution ended in 1891 with the closing of the Industrial School. Although the Industrial School "utterly failed to accomplish the objects for which it was established," institutionalization remained the cornerstone of juvenile justice policy in San Francisco and California.⁹

In 1909, five years after the passage of California's Juvenile Court Act, California passed the Detention Home Act, which required "that every county should provide and maintain, at the expense of such county, a home for the detention of dependent and delinquent children, independent of a jail or prison."¹⁰ The purpose of this legislation was to eliminate the practice of housing juveniles with adult offenders. Although well-intended, it

inadvertently established a statutory precedent upon which secure detention facilities became the primary response to both child welfare and delinquency issues throughout California.¹¹

With the opening of a juvenile detention facility in 1907, San Francisco's juvenile justice system preceded the requirements of the Detention Home Act by two years, but the system continued to be the subject of controversy.¹² Because of crowding and poor conditions, the facility was soon replaced by a larger detention home in 1916. But, like its predecessor, within ten years the new facility also became the target of intense criticism due to abusive conditions. This criticism was expressed in a 1924 article following the release of a grand jury investigation report: "The Detention Home was built in 1916 and since that time, it is argued, only a very small sum of money was spent for upkeep and the building has deteriorated to such an extent that it is almost unfit for human habitation."¹³ Repeatedly stung by these scathing assessments throughout the 1930s and 1940s, San Francisco officials again attempted to resolve the problem by constructing a larger facility.

The opening of the new Youth Guidance Center (YGC) in 1950 was hailed as the final solution to the overcrowding and poor conditions that plagued the city's earlier detention centers. Unfortunately, just as in previous eras, optimistic expectations about the YGC were dashed as the facility quickly filled beyond its capacity.¹⁴ Within three years after its opening, when it became embroiled in controversy over substandard conditions and ineffective management, officials had begun calling for its closure.¹⁵

Expensive and cumbersome, detention facilities drained county coffers, leaving few resources available for alternate options or creative programming. Overcrowding and deteriorating conditions plagued detention facilities. A 1954 report by the California Committee on Temporary Child Care questioned the emphasis on detention centers. In analyzing the state's detention rates, which were exceptionally high in comparison to the rest of the country, the committee observed: "Detention is one part of the total community program for children. Its use in large measure is determined by other services which exist. Unless other services are available the use of detention supplants the services the child really needs."¹⁶

In its 1962 review of the city's juvenile justice system, San Francisco's Juvenile Court Committee of the Bar Association noted, "No program of rehabilitation or organized counseling exists for delinquents or dependents. As a result, children are released without any effective program tending to insure against their return."¹⁷ A subsequent study in 1968 by the Bay Area Social Planning Council concluded "only a thorough reorganization of the entire system of juvenile justice will, in the long run,

permit raising the quality of service for minors in this city to a totally acceptable level."¹⁸

The use of detention facilities in California continued unabated, however, and more critics continued to question the state's unusually high detention rates. A 1975 analysis of state detention centers by the California Youth Authority made the following conclusions: "35 percent of the children admitted to juvenile hall are released within 24 hours; almost two-thirds are released within 72 hours. Serious questions may therefore be raised on why they were detained in the first place."¹⁹ As of 1992, forty percent of referrals to the San Francisco Youth Guidance Center were customarily released within twenty-four hours, and fifty-seven percent were released within seventy-two hours.²⁰

Pressure for a new approach accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s. After another series of critical reports, the juvenile court finally commissioned a comprehensive proposal of structural reform. Conducted by Jefferson and Associates, the final report posited the need for a new approach and urged reconsideration of the system's institutional emphasis. Researchers found an almost unwavering emphasis on custodial confinement on the part of institutional staff, even for minor and petty offenders. For example, when researchers evaluated the detention population using a risk-assessment scale developed by the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,²¹ they discovered that over half of these juveniles were unnecessarily detained, and that the facility size could be reduced to less than forty high-security beds through the introduction of appropriate alternatives.²²

A NEW APPROACH

Reinventing San Francisco's juvenile justice system requires abandonment of the stifling, centralized, institutional approach of the past century and the adoption of a new organizational structure and direction. An effective organizational structure must maximize accountability, flexibility, innovation, service integration, and individualization.²³ A contract-based system, offering alternatives to detention by providing a continuum of services, can maximize these qualities.

Presently, approximately 3,000 youths are referred to the YGC on a yearly basis. As previously shown, most will be released within seventy-two hours, while more than eighty percent will be released within three weeks and can expect to receive little or no follow-up. A reduction in size and a restriction of service to secure care for serious and violent offenders would result in surplus resources, which could be reallocated to a full range of comprehensive interventions and services. Tables 3 through 5 provide a cost analysis of the various juvenile hall proposals and the resource implications. Table 6

illustrates the potential programs that could be funded and the number of youths that could be served if the juvenile hall were reduced to fifty beds. Table 3 illustrates the contrasting implications of expanding the juvenile hall. Previously, an expansion of the juvenile hall has resulted in a reduction of services as a means to cover increased facility operating costs.²⁴

Under the proposed system, resources should be directed toward the portion of the delinquent population considered to be at highest risk and most chronic, and secure detention should be just one element of a full continuum of services. Services will be obtained through contractual agreements, on a case-by-case basis, or by ongoing arrangements with nonprofit agencies located in each youth's neighborhood. According to Jefferson and Associates:

A review of recent policy and practices nationwide supports the much heralded but long delayed movement from institutional care to community-based programs as a principal means for reducing youth crime. Issues presented in the recent literature deal with substandard conditions of confinement and the high cost of secure care... and the need to forge a new partnership between the public and private sectors to build the community resources necessary to reduce youth crime.²⁵

Instead of delivering direct services under the new system, the probation department will work in collaboration with local communities to "identify, procure, train, develop, monitor, reimburse and evaluate a variety of direct services."²⁶ A community may be defined as "the smallest local territory that incorporates a network of relationships providing most of the goods and services required by persons living within the boundaries of the territory."²⁷

A system based on contracted services will provide the ingredients essential to the establishment of the accountability and innovative dynamic which is lacking in the present system.²⁸ Under a contract-for-service system, programs and services are designed according to identified needs in each community. The goal is to redirect resources toward youth and community-based programs and to establish a continuum of interventions. Interventions are designed:

- (1) to provide a humane and livable program environment that does not alienate, embitter, or harm youth;
- (2) to alter in a constructive fashion the self-image, values, attitudes, skills, knowledge, or habits of youth (rehabilitation);
- (3) to establish or re-establish positive and

supportive relationships between youth and relevant persons in the free community such as parents, teachers, employers, police, and peers (reintegration); (4) to maintain direct control over the behavior of youth during the period they are under agency jurisdiction.²⁹

Under the proposed system, the probation department, in collaboration with local communities, will determine the range of services appropriate for the current offender population. After determining a mix of programs, the department will solicit bids from local nonprofit service providers. Many of these providers will be located in the communities and neighborhoods where the youths reside.³⁰

Contracts will be awarded through a competitive process, whereby service providers will be evaluated on their ability to deliver the solicited services. Once selected, service providers and department staff will negotiate the details of the service and establish appropriate, quantifiable objectives (Table 1 provides an example of objectives for an aftercare program for high-risk offenders).³¹ The contract of any provider who consistently fails to meet objectives will be canceled and a new provider will be solicited.³²

An advantage of this system lies in the fact that the probation staff will not provide direct service, but will work to develop the capacity of community agencies to institute high-quality services and to reduce service fragmentation. For example, were the department to determine that a high-intensity supervision program is required for a small population of offenders, a contractual arrangement with a suitable agency would be negotiated. If necessary, the department might contract with another agency for the provision of day-treatment slots. Through this public-private partnership, the department would help facilitate interagency collaboration and service integration. When compared with the present system, whereby youths on probation are simply ordered to attend certain programs with little coordination or follow-up, such integration would constitute a marked improvement.

A contract-for-service system will allow for a fluid and flexible range of services that can be continually altered as needs and conditions change. To maintain innovation and accountability, protect against stagnation and ensure ongoing analysis, contracts can be renewed every three years. (Table 2 depicts a county-based continuum of contracted services for a juvenile detention/probation system.)³³

The essential component required for the coordination of services within the continuum is case management. This is the process by which one individual is given responsibility for the assessment, planning, referral, monitoring, and evaluation of a particular youth

or caseload of youths. The purpose is to offer service continuity, particularly benefiting those clients who participate in multiple programs. It is widely recognized in the field of human services that case management of community-based services provides "the key to systemic success in a complex system of services by virtue of providing consistent advocates for the client and family and by coordinating and monitoring all services throughout the course of treatment."³⁴ Case managers may help clients find employment or enroll in school. In situations where clients are encountering family problems, case managers can offer crisis counseling to stabilize the home situation or to locate a temporary shelter. In contrast with the present system, case managers can be directly involved in every aspect of their client's life, potentially helping with the development of positive attitudes and social skills. (Figure 1 depicts the case management process.) To achieve this level of involvement, case managers must have the ability to foster trusting relationships in a culturally competent manner with clients from diverse communities and backgrounds. Cultural competence is defined as "acceptance and respect for difference, continuing self-assessment regarding culture, careful attention to the dynamics of difference, continuous expansion of cultural knowledge and resources, and a variety of adaptations to service models in order to better meet the needs of minority populations."³⁵

A creative approach to culturally competent case management was developed in 1993 by five San Francisco community-based agencies which established the Detention Diversion Advocacy Project. Composed of agencies from the city's major ethnic communities, the project provides intensive case management for those youths who otherwise would be detained pending adjudication of their cases. By drawing its staff from the participating community-based agencies, the program is able to provide a wide range of culturally specific services and interventions. Operating from a central location, the program's unique method of emphasizing collaboration, diversity, and case management has won numerous awards and recognition, including the San Francisco Delinquency Prevention Commission's "Agency of the Year" award and the "Diversity Award" from the Center on Human Development.

AN INTERVENTION SYSTEM FOR HIGH-RISK CHRONIC OFFENDERS

If the juvenile justice system is to gain public trust and confidence, it must improve its willingness and capacity to deal with serious and high-risk offenders. This small yet visible segment of the offender population accounts for a large percentage of juvenile arrests. This is illustrated by a finding that almost a third of the YGC's

detention population has been rebooked into the facility on other charges at least once in the same year.³⁶

Along with the implementation of a contract-for-service system, the juvenile justice system should reconsider its programming for serious and high-risk offenders. The programming should involve intensive case management, wraparound services, and flexible funding. Intensive case management can function as the vital coordinating component to individualized service. Under intensive case management, youths receive a higher level of monitoring and supervision than that offered by a standard case management approach. In some situations, intensive case management may include a full-time case manager and a part-time case monitor to maximize structure, support, and supervision.³⁷

Individualized interventions for serious high-risk offenders can be facilitated through wraparound services. The concept of wraparound services, which involves the design of interventions around identified needs, was first introduced in the mental health field for the treatment of severely emotionally disturbed youths. With wraparound services, if a youth's entire range of needs cannot be served through existing programs and support networks, then necessary services will be purchased on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.³⁸

Essential to the implementation of wraparound services is flexible funding. Flexible funding involves the maintenance of a pool of discretionary funding for the purchase of specialized services. Specialized services can range from psychological counseling to those fulfilling transportation needs.³⁹ (For examples of case management, wraparound services, and flexible funding for the serious offender, see Case Examples 1 and 2 immediately before the Appendix.)

IMPLEMENTING AND FINANCING THE CHANGE

A major obstacle to juvenile justice reform is the difficulty of diverting currently committed revenues toward new programs. So, although the operation of a contract-for-service system is less expensive than the cost of an institution-based system, the initial conversion will require seed money. Furthermore, the cost savings will only occur if the changes represent systemic restructuring rather than simply serving as add-ons to the existing system.⁴⁰

Bond measures are one potential means by which to finance the restructuring. Just as bonds function as the primary means by which to fund new jails and prisons, they can also provide an approach to funding renovation and development of community-based multiservice centers. There are two forms of bond measures: general obligation bonds and revenue bonds. General obligation bonds require voter approval, and, in the case of new large

construction projects, they require a two-thirds majority vote. By contrast, revenue bonds require either a bare majority vote or in some instances no voter approval. Rules governing revenue bonds are less stringent because they are intended to promote those projects which generate income, such as government-owned or operated convention centers or airports. However, in the past ten years, California has used revenue bonds to finance prison building when attempts to gain voter approval for general obligation bonds have failed. The notion of using revenue bonds for prison construction is premised on the state's ability to obtain revenues from vendors contracted to provide prison services. Applying this logic at the local level would suggest that San Francisco could issue revenue bonds to construct new community-based centers and subsequently obtain revenue from the lease of the facilities to community-based service providers. This approach would avoid the two-thirds majority vote requirement of a successful general obligation bond proposal, and thereby help overcome the opposition that has been able to defeat proposals for a smaller juvenile hall.⁴¹

Presently, the San Francisco-based Coleman Advocates for Children and Youth is proposing a general obligation bond measure to fund the construction and renovation of community-based multiservice centers, recreation facilities, and a new juvenile hall. The purpose of the proposal is to tie all three facilities into a comprehensive and integrated approach to the provision of children's services.⁴²

Along with financing the construction of new facilities, start-up funds for new programs and employee buyouts must also be secured. In recent years, large, private philanthropic foundations have invested large sums of money to subsidize local-level system conversions in juvenile justice. Intensive case-management programs, designed to reduce institutional populations and expedite the development of community-based interventions, have been among the programs funded.⁴³

Ultimately, the reduction in size of the institutional population will allow the transfer of currently committed institutional funds to noninstitutional programs. Currently, less than ten percent of the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department's budget is used to purchase contracted services, while most of the remaining budget is directed toward institutional and administrative operations. This institutional emphasis stands in dramatic contrast to the philosophy of those restructured juvenile justice systems that direct over sixty percent of their budgets to contracted programs.⁴⁴ Other jurisdictions that have undergone similar conversions have witnessed resultant higher quality services and reduced costs.

Along with financial restructuring, civil service restrictions will have to be altered to permit the assignment of current staff to other city departments or to allow them to accept employment with contracted nonprofit organizations while temporarily retaining civil service status.⁴⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Dominated by archaic institutional structures and rigid, ineffectual policies, San Francisco's juvenile justice system is incapable of achieving the rehabilitative goals on which it was founded. Despite recognized failings, the system has effectively resisted change for more than a century. The challenges of implementing juvenile justice reform are well-documented and require concerted commitment from administrators, policymakers, and advocates.⁴⁶

Successful reform movements in the juvenile justice field have resulted from determined efforts by innovative administrators and citizen advocacy groups willing to confront institutional interest groups and political obstacles. The most notable examples of juvenile justice systems that have undergone comprehensive restructuring are those in Massachusetts and Utah. These states have eliminated their centralized, institution-based systems and have implemented a system founded on community-based care and contracted services.⁴⁷ In assessing the impact of the reforms on juvenile justice services in his state, former Massachusetts Department of Youth Services Commissioner Edward Loughran observed: "Purchase of service accounts permit the state to redirect funding to new programs rather than trying to alter already existing programs in the state bureaucracy."⁴⁸ Through service contracting, Massachusetts was able to promote innovation and to eliminate obsolete, ineffective programs. According to Loughran:

For 125 years, Massachusetts committed itself to a single system of intervention with young offenders. The state-operated approach was virtually assured of funding from year to year and had little if any incentive to be creative or innovative. Privatization introduced an essential element. By regularly rebidding contracts, a competitive spirit is maintained that ensures the development of new and varied approaches to combating juvenile crime.⁴⁹

Evaluations of restructured juvenile justice systems show that the new service-delivery systems are more effective and are operated at the same or lower costs than the old institutional systems. Furthermore, once separated from their direct-service responsibilities, public sector staff quickly adapt to their primary role of service-contract

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oversight.⁵⁰ In the old system, dominated by public sector administered services, success was "defined by getting a larger budget rather than obtaining results."⁵¹ In the new system, roles are clearly separated, and the onus is on the contracted service provider to produce measurable outcomes.

Major structural changes in San Francisco's juvenile justice system are long overdue. Efforts to preserve the status quo by building a larger juvenile hall while expanding the system's jurisdiction over a population of low-risk offenders should be resisted and viewed as an abdication of responsibility. The juvenile justice system should be viewed as one element along a continuum of social institutions designed to foster social development. As part of this continuum, which includes families, schools, churches, and communities, the limited resources of the juvenile justice system should be reserved for ameliorating the social and psychological conditions that sustain delinquent behavior among serious and chronic offenders. San Francisco must move to relinquish its century-old bureaucratic structure and establish a new, comprehensive approach that stands ready to meet the challenges of a diverse population.

CASE EXAMPLES

CASE EXAMPLE 1

Robert is a 17-year-old youth who killed his mother after years of physical and emotional abuse. When he was five years old, his parents divorced and he remained in his mother's custody. Robert's mother was described as an abusive woman who was well known as a local drug dealer. Throughout his life he was subjected to random and frequent beatings by his mother and stepfather. These beatings occurred with little provocation, often for nothing more than coming home late from school.

Instead of striking back, Robert repressed his feelings and became withdrawn and submissive. The incident that finally led him to retaliate occurred when his mother had him fired from a part time job at a local ice cream store. When he returned home from school on that day, she told him what she did while verbally abusing him. At that point, he picked up his stepfather's gun and threatened her. As she continued to denigrate him, he shot and killed her. He turned himself into the police a short time afterwards.

A therapist at the juvenile hall remarked that his remorse was "phenomenal" and that he was still protective of his mother. His counselor also noted that he had a life that was "devoid of affection." At his trial, he frequently remarked how he could not understand why people would care about him.

Wraparound services for Robert would include specialized foster care with a contracted and licensed

agency. Because he has no history of aggressive or defiant behavior in school, existing services could address education and vocational training needs. With discretionary funds, specialized counseling services would be purchased from a specialist with knowledge and background in parricide issues. Robert would also participate in a support group for survivors of child abuse. Along with providing close supervision, the case manager would work closely with each agency to ensure sensitivity to Robert's situation and background and help overcome any anxieties or concerns.

CASE EXAMPLE 2

Jose is a 16-year-old who has a history of robbery and gun possession. He lived with his mother, who had a history of substance abuse, in a low-income area where he and most of his siblings are active gang members. He has been abusing drugs since he was ten years old and he is functioning academically at a fifth-grade level.

To address Jose's substance abuse, he would be required to participate in a 30-day residential treatment program. After completing the program, he would be placed in the home of relatives who were willing to take him to a middle-class neighborhood where he would attend outpatient counseling. In addition, he would also receive in-home family counseling to assist with adjustment and relationship issues. He would also attend a remedial education program to work toward his GED and would participate in a prison education program offered by inmates at a local prison.

Jose has recently begun participating in a local boxing program. During the time he was in the program, he remained drug-free and did not get into trouble. As part of his program, he will be enrolled in a boxing program near his aunt and uncle's home and discretionary funds will be used for gym fees, boxing shoes, and other needed equipment. Supervision will include daily contacts for at least the first months and then gradually be adjusted based upon his performance in the program.

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APPENDIX:

TABLE 1: Outcome Objectives For An Aftercare Program For High-Risk Juvenile Offenders

100% of youths released to the project will be provided a reintegration plan
75% will not be rearrested during the time they are participating in the program
60% will be enrolled in an education/vocational training program
65% will participate in peer support and/or violence-reduction program
30% will participate in a substance-abuse program
30% will participate in individual counseling
25% of client parents will participate in parent support or education programs
35% will be employed on at least a part-time basis
SOURCE: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice

TABLE 2: County-Based Program Continuum For A Juvenile Detention/Probation System

Preadjudication Detention
Community-Based Multiservice Intake Units
Home Supervision
Staff Secure Shelter Care
Post Disposition
<i>Nonresidential</i>
Restitution/Community Service
Remedial Education Services
Vocational Training/Employment Referral
Intensive Tracking And Monitoring
Day Treatment
Outpatient Drug Treatment
Crisis Intervention/Family Counseling
Boys And Girls Mentoring Services
<i>Residential</i>
Specialized Foster Care
Intensive Staff-Secure Group Home
Experiential Stress/Challenge Program
Short And Long Term Residential Drug Treatment
Secure-Treatment Program For Violent And Aggressive Offenders
Source: Center On Juvenile And Criminal Justice

TABLE 3: Cost Analysis Of A 50-Bed Juvenile Hall

Present Yearly Operating Cost Of 135-Bed San Francisco Juvenile Hall	\$5,864,354
Estimated Yearly Operating Cost At Current Rates	\$2,190,000
Estimated Savings On Current Operating Costs	\$3,674,354
Source: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department	

TABLE 4: Cost Analysis Of A 75-Bed Juvenile Hall

Present Yearly Operating Cost Of 135-Bed San Francisco Juvenile Hall	\$5,864,354
Estimated Yearly Operating Cost At Current Rates	\$3,285,000
Estimated Savings On Current Operating Costs	\$2,579,354
Source: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department	

TABLE 5: Cost Analysis Of A 150-Bed Juvenile Hall

Present Yearly Operating Cost Of 135-Bed San Francisco Juvenile Hall	\$5,864,354
Estimated Yearly Operating Cost At Current Rates	\$6,570,000
Estimated Additional Costs On Current Operating Budget	\$705,646
Source: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department	

TABLE 6: Potential Programs Funded Through Savings From 50-Bed Juvenile Hall

	Cost per Slot	Number of Slots	Estimated Number of Youth Served Yearly	Average Length of Time in Program	Total Program Cost
Intensive Tracking & Monitoring	\$10,000	100	870	6 weeks	\$1,000,000
Day Treatment	\$15,000	50	100	6 months	\$750,000
Experiential Stress/Challenge Program	\$12,500	20	180	30 days	\$250,000
Specialized Foster Care	\$18,000	25	15	1 year+	\$450,000
Staff-Secure Temporary Shelter Care	\$40,000	10	87	6 weeks	\$400,000
Total		205	1,252		\$2,850,000
Average Cost Per Slot	\$19,100				
<i>Available for Additional Programming & Services</i>					\$824,354
Source: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice					

NOTES

¹ STEVE LERNER, *BODILY HARM: THE PATTERN OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE AT THE CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY* 11-15 (1986).

² *Industrial School Investigation*, DAILY EVENING BULL., June 14, 1869, at 1.

³ Barry Krisberg & James Austin, *THE CHILDREN OF ISHMAEL* 14-24 (1978); Kenneth Wooden, *WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS* 95-105 (1976); Albert R. Roberts, *JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES* 21-27 (1989); Charles Loring Brace, *THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK AND TWENTY YEARS OF WORK AMONG THEM* 224-25 (1973).

⁴ *Secretary Report on the Industrial School*, in SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL REPORTS 373 (1870).

⁵ RANDALL SHELDEN, *DIVERTING YOUTH: JUVENILE JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE* 1 (1977).

⁶ *The Industrial School: Investigation of Charges Against the Industrial School Management*, ALTA CALIFORNIA, July 8, 1869, at 1.

⁷ Clarence Johnson, *Abuse Charges Probed at S.F. Juvenile Hall*, S.F. CHRON., May 2, 1992, at A16.

⁸ JEFFERSON AND ASSOC. & PATRICK SULLIVAN ASSOC., *FACILITY DESIGN OPTIONS FOR THE CARE AND TREATMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO'S YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS* 16 (1987).

⁹ *Wiped Out at Last: The Industrial School Has Passed into History*, S.F. CALL, Nov. 24, 1891, at 2.

¹⁰ 1909 Cal. Stat. 133 (provided mandatory detention home for young offenders); SHERWOOD NORMAN & DOROTHY ALLEN, *CALIFORNIA CHILDREN IN DETENTION AND SHELTER CARE* 1 (1955).

¹¹ *Id.*; JAMES ALAN BROZEK, *HISTORY OF JUVENILE DETENTION IN CALIFORNIA: 1850-1972* 16-30 (1974).

¹² *Chief Probation Officer Under Fire: Detention Home to Get a General Overhauling*, S.F. CALL, Feb. 10, 1911, at 1; *Investigation of Detention Home Planned*, S.F. CALL, Feb. 12, 1911, at 2.

¹³ *S.F. Detention Home to Be Inspected*, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 4, 1924, at 4.

¹⁴ *Jury Reports Needs of Youth Center*, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24, 1957, at 4.

¹⁵ Pierre Salinger, *Abandonment of Youth Guidance Center Proposed*, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 1953, at 1.

¹⁶ NORMAN & ALLEN, *supra* note 10, at 38.

¹⁷ RALPH E. BOCHES ET AL., *REPORT OF THE JUVENILE COURT*

COMMITTEE OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO 54-55 (1962).

¹⁸ BAY AREA SOCIAL PLANNING COUNCIL, *SAN FRANCISCO JUVENILE COURT, THREE PHASE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY COMMITTEE* 5 (1969).

¹⁹ GEORGE SALEEBY, *HIDDEN CLOSETS: A STUDY OF DETENTION PRACTICES IN CALIFORNIA* 2 (1975).

²⁰ SAN FRANCISCO JUVENILE PROBATION DEPARTMENT, *ANNUAL REPORT* 40 (1992).

²¹ 42 U.S.C. 5665 et. seq. (1995) (established as a result of the 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act).

²² JEFFERSON AND ASSOC. & COMMUNITY RESEARCH ASSOC., *CREATING A NEW AGENDA FOR THE CARE AND TREATMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO'S YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS* 81 (1987).

²³ BETH A. STROUL & ROBERT M. FRIEDMAN, *THE CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SERVICE SYSTEM PROGRAM, A SYSTEM OF CARE FOR SEVERELY EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED CHILDREN AND YOUTH* 16-24 (1986).

²⁴ When the YGC was opened in 1950, six probation officer positions were eliminated because of additional operating costs associated with the larger facility. See San Francisco City and County Budget reports from 1949 through 1951.

²⁵ JEFFERSON AND ASSOC., *supra* note 22, at 9.

²⁶ *Id.* at 171.

²⁷ ROBERT B. COATES ET AL., *DIVERSITY IN A YOUTH CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM: HANDLING DELINQUENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS* 6 (1978).

²⁸ *Id.* at 193.

²⁹ LLOYD E. OHLIN ET AL., *REFORMING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIMENT* 23 (1978).

³⁰ IRA M. SCHWARTZ & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, *RESTRUCTURING YOUTH CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS: A GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS* 7-15 (1991); YITZHAK BAKAL & HOWARD POLSKY, *REFORMING CORRECTIONS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS* 59-73 (1979).

³¹ NANCY YOUNG ET AL., *MAKING A DIFFERENCE: MOVING TO OUTCOME-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE SERVICE REFORMS* 5-24 (1994).

³² BAKAL & POLSKY, *supra* note 30, at 165-77.

³³ Edward J. Loughran, *Privatization in Juvenile Services: Competition Promotes Quality*, 50 CORRECTIONS TODAY 82 (1988).

³⁴ L. BEHAR, *CLOSE TO HOME: COMMUNITY BASED MENTAL*

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³⁵ TERRY L. CROSS ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, TOWARDS A CULTURALLY COMPETENT SYSTEM OF CARE 17 (1989).

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³⁷ JUDITH W. KATZ-LEAVY ET AL., INDIVIDUALIZED SERVICES IN A SYSTEM OF CARE 28 (1992).

³⁸ *Id.* at 9.

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ THE CONSERVATION COMPANY & THE JUVENILE LAW CENTER BUILDING BRIDGES: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCING FOR SYSTEM REFORM 16-18 (1994); BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., UNLOCKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS: EVALUATING THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES 33-42 (1989).

⁴¹ THE CONSERVATION COMPANY & THE JUVENILE LAW CENTER, *supra* note 40, at 20-22; COLEMAN ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, THE YOUTH BOND (1995).

⁴² COLEMAN ADVOCATES, *supra* note 41.

⁴³ Presently, the Anne E. Casey Foundation is sponsoring juvenile detention reforms in five major jurisdictions around the country.

⁴⁴ SCHWARTZ & LOUGHRAN, *supra* note 30, at 57.

⁴⁵ NATIONAL OFFICE FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN JUVENILE PROBATION 16-20 (1986); DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 34-70 (1992).

⁴⁶ JEROME MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL: THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIMENT IN CLOSING REFORM SCHOOLS 83-218 (1991).

⁴⁷ SCHWARTZ & LOUGHRAN, *supra* note 30, at 7-17.

⁴⁸ Loughran, *supra* note 33, at 80.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 83.

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 179 (1985).